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SECOND BEST DAMAGE ACTION DETERRENCE
Margo Schlanger*
INTRODUCTION
Potential defendants faced with the prospect of tort or tort-like
damage actions can reduce their liability exposure in a number of
ways. Prior scholarship has dwelled primarily on the possibility that
they may respond to the threat of liability by augmenting the amount
of care they take.' Defendants (I limit myself to defendants for sim-
plicity) will increase their expenditures on care, so the theory goes,
when those expenditures yield sufficient liability-reducing dividends;
more care decreases liability exposure by simultaneously making it
less likely that the actors will be found to have behaved tortiously in
the event of an accident and subsequent lawsuit, and by shrinking the
probability and perhaps the severity of accidents. What prior scholar-
ship has not focused on is that even contemplated behavioral
changes-in the type rather than amount of care defendants take, or
the type rather than amount of harm they inflict-that do nothing to
shift the probability or severity of accidents may, in many circum-
stances, limit expected liability by lowering the probability of claims
or losses, or the expected amount of damages. In particular, I argue in
this paper that potential litigation can induce potential defendants to
favor more cognizable or demonstrable care, and less cognizable or
demonstrable harm.
The circumstances in which I am interested abound. For example,
in negligence law, some types of care are well suited to documentary
proof, others need testimony, and still others are not well suited to
* Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. Thanks to Steve Landsman for invit-
ing me to participate in the 2005 Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy. I received
helpful comments from Symposium participants, as well as from participants in the faculty work-
shop at UCLA, Susan Appleton, Tom Baker, Mark Geistfeld, Doug Kysar, Laura Rosenbury,
Cathy Sharkey, Steve Shavell, Nancy Staudt, Kent Syverud, and, as always, Sam Bagenstos. I
also received helpful feedback on presentations of an early and very different version of this
paper from participants in faculty workshops at Cornell, University of Minnesota, University of
Texas, and Washington University in St. Louis. Errors that remain are of course my responsibil-
ity. Copyright © 2005 by Margo Schlanger. Permission is granted to copy for free or at-cost
distribution to students enrolled in a class.
1. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
111 HARV. L. REv. 869, 876 n.12 (1998) (citing sources spanning 1838 to the present).
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courtroom proof at all. So because the substantive law of negligence
is inevitably inflected by the litigation system, the expected value of
damages varies, not only with the cost of care and the resulting level
of accidents, but with that care's ease of proof. The result of this
fact-stated most generally, that damages are not simply a function of
the cost and yield of care-is what I term a "substitution effect": in my
example above, potential defendants are likely to anticipate the com-
bination of tort law and litigation and respond by substituting acci-
dent-avoidance measures that are easier to prove up for those that are
harder, all other things being equal.
Potential defendants should be expected to take advantage of myr-
iad liability-minimizing substitution opportunities. I discuss several
below. In each, defendants have incentives to substitute towards or
away from a given type of care or a given type of harm, not because
the substitute is more beneficial in terms of accident avoidance, but
because it is more favorable in its expected litigation effects. As the
example above suggests, potential defendants will favor types of care
that are more demonstrable or (even more basic) legally cognizable.
Conversely, potential defendants will prefer types of harm that are
less demonstrable or legally cognizable. That is, they will avoid in-
forming an injured party of the origin of his or her harm, and, more
interestingly, prefer causing those types of harm whose origin or tor-
tiousness is not evident or for which no liability is recognized. In
short, the amount of care is only one of the many choices relating to
compliance influenced by damage action deterrence. Substitution op-
portunities and the resulting substitution effects relating to the type of
care and harm are also important and require attention.
The points I am making fit in the general category of applications of
the theory of the "second best."'2 That theory, foundational to mod-
ern welfare economics, if a bit underappreciated within law-and-eco-
nomics,3  suggests that when economic systems suffer from
inconsistent or otherwise nonoptimal features, correction of some sub-
set of such features may well backfire:4 "In essence, the theory of the
2. For the first discussion of the general theory, see R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The
General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).
3. See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, Courts, Legislatures, and the General Theory of Second Best in
Law and Economics, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 189, 191 (1998) ("Neither private nor public law
economic analysts, however, have paid much attention to a well-known proposition in welfare
economics known as the General Theory of Second Best .... ").
4. See, e.g., Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 2, at 12 ("[In a situation in which there exist many
constraints which prevent the fulfillment of the Pareteian optimum conditions, the removal of
any one constraint may affect welfare or efficiency either by raising it, by lowering it, or by
leaving it unchanged.").
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second best tells regulators to think twice about forcefully regulating
one area of activity when those affected have access to a more-or-less
substitutable area of activity that cannot be reached effectively with
similar regulation." 5 Similarly, I am suggesting that interventions in
torts that fail to take account of the substitution opportunities I de-
scribe may have problematic consequences. However, where many
applications of the theory of the second best look extremely broadly
at multiple markets and market participants, as well as the relevant
legal frameworks, 6 mine remains more manageably situated within
torts as inflected by litigation processes.
In that realm, my work is mostly synthetic. Other scholars have
noticed and analyzed the particular items I discuss, but prior scholar-
ship has underplayed the importance of these substitution effects in
several ways.7 First, that scholarship has failed to link the effects con-
ceptually. Second, perhaps as a result of the first, it has failed to no-
tice the high rate of occurrence of substitution opportunities and
resulting substitution effects. Third, prior work has not appreciated
the impact of that high rate. The fact that different types of care and
harm produce different levels of expected damages means that the
relationship between harm and damages is far more complex than
much previous inquiry has assumed. Where prior scholarship has ar-
gued that optimal deterrence requires some multiplier mechanism to
counteract underclaiming of various kinds,8 my substitution effect
analysis demonstrates that in order to be even hypothetically suffi-
cient, a multiplier regime would have to be much more comprehen-
sive. It would have to offset each variation among alternatives that
affects the probability of winning litigation, of reducing damages, and
of being subjected to a claim altogether. Indeed, the complexity of
the adjustments that would be necessary to preserve perfect ex ante
correspondence between harm and damages is daunting enough to
seem impracticable. More generally, the prevalence of substitution ef-
fects means that many proposed systematic interventions into tort de-
terrence are unlikely to work as anticipated. At the same time,
5. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability
Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1291-92 (1991).
6. I am thinking, especially, of the valuable but difficult work of Richard Markovits. See, e.g.,
Richard S. Markovits, Monopoly and the Allocative Inefficiency of First-Best-Allocatively-Effi-
cient Tort Law in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: The Whys and Some Therefores, 46 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 313 (1996); Richard S. Markovits, The Allocative Efficiency of Shifting From a
"Negligence" System to a "Strict-Liability" Regime in Our Highly-Pareto-Imperfect Economy: A
Partial and Preliminary Third-Best-Allocative-Efficiency Analysis, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11
(1998).
7. See infra Part II.
8. See sources cited infra notes 10, 13, 14.
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attention to the comparative element of damage action deterrence
counsels in favor of a less ambitious set of interventions-one that
tries at most to even out incentives among various options rather than
to perfect them.
I begin with a short review of relevant prior scholarship, proceed to
set out my examples of substitution opportunities and effects, and
conclude by mentioning some policy implications.
II. Ex ANTE DAMAGE ACTION INCENTIVES: PRIOR LITERATURE
Most deterrence scholarship takes for granted the general applica-
bility of what I will call the "identity principle"-that optimal deter-
rence requires an ex ante identity between plaintiffs' expected losses
and defendants' expected damages.9 If every tortiously injured victim
could be expected to seek compensation, the identity principle would
require a simple equality between the harm the victims experienced
and the damages their injurers paid as a result. But even once analysis
recognizes that not every injury is discovered and not every victim
seeks compensation, the identity principle remains. For example, a
much-remarked article by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
concerns litigation realities that tend to undermine deterrence even
when damages are set equal to harm, such as "the difficulty of de-
tecting harm, the inability to identify the injurer, problems in proving
that the injurer is liable even if he can be identified, and the plaintiff's
failure to sue because of the costs of litigation." 1° These underclaim-
ing problems led Polinsky and Shavell to propose that punitive dam-
ages routinely be awarded in an amount sufficient to make up for the
ex ante probability that a defendant might have escaped liability for
the harm it caused. For them, the identity principle was foundational:
"Our conclusions . . . flow from the basic principle that, to achieve
appropriate deterrence, injurers should be made to pay for the harm
9. Of course, if the liability assessment is unfailingly accurate and defendants cannot uninten-
tionally violate the legal standard, damages for violation of a given legal standard may be set at
an infinitely high level without fear of overdeterrence; no rational defendant will offend, but
nobody will have to worry about either actual or attributed mistaken offenses. Cf. A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of
Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880, 880 & n.3 (1979). This approach would, however, create new,
marginal deterrence problems; anyone who decided to violate the rule could rationally decide
that they were "in for a penny, in for a pound" and commit even a worse violation than they
might otherwise have contemplated. Cf. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCI-
PLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 178 (J.H. Bums ed., 1996) (1781) ("Where two offences
come in competition, the punishment for the greater offence must be sufficient to induce a man
to prefer the less.").
10. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 874 n.7. For an earlier treatment, see Dorsey D. Ellis,
Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982).
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their conduct generates, not less, not more."' 1 Polinsky and Shavell
expanded on the need for an ex ante identity between the expected
value of total damages and the expected value of total harm with a
summary of the standard law-and-economics position:
If injurers pay less than for the harm they cause, underdeterrence
may result-that is, precautions may be inadequate, product prices
may be too low, and risk-producing activities may be excessive.
Conversely, if injurers are made to pay more than for the harm they
cause, wasteful precautions may be taken, product prices may be
inappropriately high, and risky but socially beneficial activities may
be undesirably curtailed.12
Similarly, Judge Guido Calabresi explained in an opinion that a poten-
tial defendant's "formal or informal, spoken or unspoken, cost-benefit
analysis" of potentially tortious activity "cannot be even roughly accu-
rate unless approximately all the costs of the activity are borne by the
actor.... In such a case ... the actor will not be adequately deterred
from undesirable activities. And society will suffer. '13 Like Polinsky
and Shavell, Calabresi's opinion uses the identity principle as the justi-
fication for a proposal that punitive damages be used as a "multiplier"
in situations in which compensatory damages are predictably less than
the actual harm caused all injury victims, because of underclaiming of
various kinds. A recent work by Keith Hylton and Thomas Miceli,
which deepens the analysis by weighing the social cost of lawsuits
against the social benefits of optimal deterrence, observes that the
multiplier principle "has been accepted as one of the basic lessons of
the law and economics literature. ' 14
Other work expands the reasons why a multiplier rather than sim-
ple equality of harm and damages might be required to implement the
identity principle. In particular, Richard Craswell, with and without
John Calfee, has written a series of articles exploring the implications
for deterrence of defendants' ex ante uncertainty, especially uncer-
tainty about the application of legal standards to their harmful con-
duct.15 In the earliest and most pertinent of these articles, Calfee and
11. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 873; see also id. at 888.
12. Id. at 873.
13. Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 243 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
14. Keith N. Hylton & Thomas J. Miceli, Should Tort Damages be Multiplied, 21 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 388, 410 (2005).
15. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with
Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984) [hereinafter Calfee & Craswell, Effects of Uncer-
tainty]; Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986); Richard Craswell, Damage Multipliers in Market Relationships, 25 J.
LEGAL S-rUD. 463 (1996); Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle
and its Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185 (1999) [hereinafter Craswell, Deterrence and
Damages].
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Craswell observed first that defendants "cannot be sure what legal
consequences will attach to each of their possible courses of action, 1 6
and second that "in most situations where the defendant can choose
from a range of possible actions, the probability of being held liable
varies with the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct.' 7 In those
circumstances, Calfee and Craswell pointed out, setting damages
equal to losses (that is, implementing the identity principle without a
multiplier) could produce either too much or too little care:
"[U]ncertainty can produce incentives to over- or undercomply even
when damages are calculated exactly"; 8 and "[e]xcessive damage
awards will not always produce overcompliance and insufficient
awards will not always lead to undercompliance."' 9 The two conflict-
ing vectors are: too little care because even actors who comply with
the relevant legal standard know that they may still face some liability
exposure if someone is nonetheless injured, and therefore the gain
from compliance and resulting incentive effect is undercut; and, alter-
natively, too much care because behavior that well exceeds bare com-
pliance is less likely to mistakenly be adjudged noncompliant than
behavior that is barely (which is to say, optimally) compliant.
In a more recent piece, Craswell connected his earlier analysis to
Polinsky and Shavell's multiplier proposal, and explained that his ear-
lier work implies that an effective multiplier would have to cancel out
not only the kind of underclaiming that Polinsky and Shavell dis-
cussed, but also the changes in probabilities of liability caused by vary-
ing degrees of misbehavior.20 In addition, Craswell expanded the
scope of his earlier analysis and explained that the ex ante expected
value of a penalty, and therefore the need for a multiplier, can vary
not only with changes in the probability of an uncertain liability find-
ing (which Craswell labelled "conviction"), but with changes in the
probability of "detection," "litigation," and "different damage
awards."' 21 Accordingly, he found that the identity principle can de-
liver optimal deterrence only if it applies precisely (and is known, ex
ante, to apply precisely)-and therefore differently-in each of the
many possible care situations. This, Craswell suggested, is unlikely to
be politically palatable, because "the case-by-case multiplier has to be
largest for those defendants who behaved relatively well (to make up
16. Calfee & Craswell, Effects of Uncertainty, supra note 15, at 968.
17. Id. at 980.
18. Id. at 986.
19. Id.
20. Craswell, Deterrence and Damages, supra note 15, at 2210-23.
21. Id.; see also Hylton & Miceli, supra note 14.
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for their low probability of punishment), and smallest for defendants
who behaved relatively badly." 22
Moreover, Craswell emphasized that the identity principle is far
from necessary for optimal deterrence. The unnecessariness of the
identity principle comes from the observation, by now seemingly mun-
dane, that deterrence by anticipation of damages is comparative-a
defendant compares the expected combination of the cost of care and
of damages under one possible course of conduct to the same combi-
nation under another course of conduct.23 Thus, only the comparative
level of anticipated damages matters-the absolute level of antici-
pated damages is simply not pertinent to the choice of conduct. As
Craswell summarized, "In economic terms, it is the marginal change in
the expected penalty [given changes in a defendant's behavior], and
not its absolute level, that governs the firm's incentives. '24 If the
change in expected damages matches the change in expected harm, it
does not matter for deterrence purposes what the level of damages is.
That is, the identity principle is not a necessary precondition for opti-
mal deterrence.
Craswell's insights are vital to this essay; it builds on his work about
the analytic importance of behavior-related changes in the probability
of litigation, liability, and damages, and about the comparative nature
of deterrence. Still, Craswell's analysis, like that of other deterrence
scholars, 25 focuses on the amount of care taken by potential defend-
ants. This, I hope to demonstrate, is too narrow a topic of inquiry,
even accepting or assuming, as this essay does, the contestable pro-
position that damage actions function as a deterrent. 26
22. Craswell, Deterrence and Damages, supra note 15, at 2234.
23. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 68-94 (1970).
24. Craswell, Deterrence and Damages, supra note 15, at 2194.
25. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 876 n.12 (citing sources spanning 1838 to the
present).
26. The first argument to the contrary is that tort law's deterrent effect is superfluous; the
second, frequently made even by scholars extremely sympathetic to economic analysis, is that
attempts at deterrence via tort are at least often futile. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Moni-
toring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance With Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 71, 117 ("[L]egal standards that ask persons to act reasonably have weak deterrence power
when the actor is convinced that he is acting reasonably."); Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the
Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 381-83
(1994) (discussing both arguments and citing many of their originators). See also W. Kip Viscusi,
The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts,
87 GEO. L.J. 285 (1998) (finding no empirical evidence that the availability of punitive damages
deters safety or environmental torts, and attributing the absence of deterrent effect to the per-
ceived randomness of punitive damages).
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III. SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS
When scholars discuss ex ante deterrence, they choose (nearly al-
ways implicitly) among three analytical axes-responses to damage-
action incentives are thought to induce changes in care geared to-
wards (a) winning litigation, (b) reducing damages, and (c) avoiding
litigation. These three interests comprise the ways in which defendants
might seek, before any particular accident occurs, to minimize their
liability exposure; they are, together, what I call the "risk manage-
ment" interests. (Ex ante risk-management interests are joined by
more typically ex post claim management interests in minimizing liti-
gation's cost, which I will not discuss here.2 7 Similarly, I am not dis-
cussing the many ways in which defendants might try to reduce their
liability exposure by changing the law, rather than their behavior, by
advocating for political interventions like damage caps or other tort
"reforms. 28) I use the three risk-management interests to organize
my presentation of situations in which potential defendants can be ex-
pected to substitute one type of care or harm for another.
A. The First Risk-Management Interest: Winning Litigation
Nearly all actors who anticipate being sued are going to try to posi-
tion themselves to win those lawsuits. 29 Before any accident takes
place (that is, ex ante), the deterrent effect of potential damages may,
as prior scholarship has emphasized, be the straightforward reason
that potential defendants take additional care. For example, perhaps
doctors, some of whose patients inevitably experience adverse health
outcomes and are therefore plausible tort plaintiffs, deal with the sali-
27. I have suggested in earlier work that various claim management techniques can have im-
portant spillover effects that cause potential defendants to make changes in their risk- and care-
taking activities. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1557, 1668-72
(2003) (discussing ways in which prison and jail efforts to minimize litigation burdens affect their
ex ante compliance with legal norms). I hope to explore this topic more fully in future work.
28. See Tom Baker & Thomas 0. Farrish, Liability Insurance and the Regulation of Firearms,
in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY 292, 296 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005) (explaining insurers' advo-
cacy for damages caps and other tort reform measures: "From a potential defendant's perspec-
tive, 'loss prevention' is really 'liability prevention,' and the elimination of liability is just as
effective as the elimination of the harm and, at least potentially, much cheaper").
29. This is demonstrably true even for many individuals whose insurance pays resulting judg-
ments, for example doctors (notwithstanding that medical malpractice insurance is mostly not
experience rated). See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality
in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 893, 980-81 (2005). It may be less true, however, for off-budget judgments against organi-
zational rather than individual defendants, for example, federal agencies. Telephone Interview
with Paul Figley, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Torts Branch (Feb. 12,
2005). See 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994) (establishing a permanent indefinite appropriation for pay-
ment of "judgments, awards, and compromise settlements").
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ent threat of malpractice liability by making sure to stay informed
about and to use treatments suggested by current clinical practice
guidelines, because when adverse outcomes eventuate, compliance
with such practices helps them defeat malpractice claims. 30 This may
or may not be the optimal level of care, but that is not the point for
present purposes; only that the effort is one of taking care, and that it
is at least partially motivated by the interest in winning litigation.
Another kind of effect is, however, equally possible. Because litiga-
tion is an institution better able to process some kinds of issues than
others, the interest in winning lawsuits will often induce potential tort
defendants to think about care in terms not of its efficacy and corre-
sponding payoff in decreasing the chance of a liability finding, but of
the care's evidentiary certainty (and the litigation cost of achieving
evidentiary certainty). Therefore, all other things being equal-and
possibly even without that constraint-in many situations potential
defendants will prefer precautions that lend themselves to documen-
tary rather than testimonial proof, because these are more likely to
help on summary judgment rather than requiring a trial.31 And even
if the stage of adjudication is the same, some kinds of evidence simply
tend to be more convincing than others to decisionmakers. Doctors
deciding whether to supplement a detailed heart examination with an
EKG might decide to provide care that leaves a more objective evi-
dentiary record-the EKG. Alternatively, they could devote more
time to charting observations than they otherwise might. 32 These
30. See Andrew L. Hyams, Jennifer A. Brandenburg, Stuart R. Lipsitz, David W. Shapiro &
Troyen A. Brennan, Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: A Two Way Street, 122 AN-
NALS INTERNAL MED. 450 (1995) [hereinafter Hyams et al., Two Way Street]; Andrew L. Hyams,
David W. Shapiro & Troyen A. Brennan, Medical Practice Guidelines in Malpractice Litigation:
An Early Retrospective, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 289 (1996) [hereinafter Hyams et al.,
Early Retrospective]. For context on this issue, see Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields:
The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
645, 662-67 (2001).
31. Obviously defendants can introduce testimonial evidence on summary judgment. See, e.g.,
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(b), (e) (discussing affidavits in support of motions for summary judgment).
But testimonial evidence is easier than documentary evidence for plaintiffs to oppose by simple
contradictory testimony. On the other hand, in arenas in which plaintiffs have little credibility
with decisionmakers (such as inmate litigation), this effect may lose power.
32. See Jerry R. Green, Medical Malpractice and the Propensity to Litigate, in THE ECONOMICS
OF MEDICAL MALPRACriCE 193, 197 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1978). Green observes: "The at-
tributes of care readily observable in court typically would be those procedures for which
records are kept: tests ordered, X-rays, frequency of reexamination, length of hospital stay. Fo-
cusing on these aspects of care when others that would be more efficient are bypassed is defen-
sive medicine." Id. at 197. Other analyses of defensive medicine self-consciously focus on a
narrower swathe of practice: avoidance of high-risk patients or procedures or performance of
extra tests or procedures. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIVE
MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 21 (1994). In any event, the adjective "defensive" is a
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could well be very good treatment decisions-EKGs are valuable di-
agnostic tools, and good (though not excessive) charting is widely be-
lieved to be essential for high quality healthcare. 33 Indeed, in general
one would expect that the kinds of evidence that potential defendants
believe lend themselves to error-free adjudication in the event of liti-
gation-provoking accidents would, for exactly the same reasons, lend
themselves to other quality control systems. The point, however, is
that when we examine the regulatory effects of damage actions, we
should expect to see some responses that are geared as much towards
evidentiary certainty as towards efficacy.
The general point-that potential defendants will tend to favor the
types of care that pay higher dividends in terms of winning cases-has
other applications as well. In negligence cases, for example, some as-
pects of caretaking are omitted from the calculus of care used by legal
decisionmakers. These are bound to be stinted in favor of other kinds
of care that are included. Defendants will tend to direct their precau-
tionary efforts in ways that earn them litigation credit. Steven
Shavell's important insight that efficient deterrence will suffer if deci-
sions about activity levels are invisible to decisionmakers in a negli-
gence regime is one example of this effect,34 but far from the only
negative label; it implies that the measure is not appropriate. My point does not depend on this
judgment; the substitution effect may often lead to good results.
33. See, e.g., Douglas L. Wood, Documentation Guidelines: Evolution, Future Direction, and
Compliance, 110 AM. J. MED. 332 (2001).
34. See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence]. Shavell concludes that because for a defendant,
negligence law takes no account of his "choice of whether to engage in his activity or, more
generally... the level at which to engage in his activity," potential defendants facing negligence
liability will "not be motivated to consider the effect on accident losses" of those choices. Id. at
2 (emphasis omitted). In strict liability, by contrast, Shavell argues, all that matters is whether an
injurer is involved in an accident, so potential strict liability defendants are appropriately "in-
duced to consider the effect on accident losses of both his level of care and his level of activity."
Id. at 3. It is not clear to what extent the negligence standard of care actually does omit activity-
level effects. Indeed, in a later treatment Shavell himself concedes that at least in some limited
circumstances negligence law may include activity level as part of the calculus of care. See
STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 26 & n.33 (1987) (citing RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 297 (1965)). See also Stephen G. Gilles, Rule-Based Negligence and
the Regulation of Activity Levels, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 320 (1992) ("My fundamental conclu-
sion is that modem American negligence law regulates activity levels to a considerably greater
extent than has previously been recognized."); Howard Latin, Activity Levels, Due Care, and
Selective Realism in Economic Analysis of Tort Law, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 487, 505 & n.50
(1987); Joseph A. Page, Liability for Unreasonably and Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Does Neg-
ligence Doctrine Have a Role to Play?, 72 CHI-KENT L. REV. 87, 96 (1996) ("[A] potential in-
jurer, in order to avoid potential liability for negligence, would need to consider both the
reasonableness of the activity to be undertaken and the reasonableness of the manner in which
he engages in the conduct in question."). Regardless of the positive accuracy of the activity level
argument, the analytic point I want to emphasize is that omitted features of caretaking are apt to
be disfavored by potential negligence defendants, but not by potential strict liability defendants.
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one.35 For example, the negligence doctrine is often said to make no
excuses for isolated inadvertence. 36 The necessary correlate of this
doctrinal point is that negligence law gives no credit for
noninadvertence-for the cost and effort of avoiding lapses in atten-
tion. Accordingly, actors who could prevent many accidents by pay-
ing attention, but who know they may nonetheless occasionally lapse
into inadvertent negligence (and therefore be subject to suit) may in-
stead substitute other methods of care-they may take what Mark
Grady has called "durable precautions" rather than softer, more per-
sonal precautions. 37 They may, for example, substitute some sort of
safety switch for a sustained effort to be careful. As with observable
care (such as EKGs or good charting), durable precautions may very
well be both more effective and more efficient than the nondurable
precautions for which they substitute. This is apparently true, for ex-
ample, in much of hospital medicine.38 But it is not necessarily the
case, and again, the point is that the availability of damages pushes
potential defendants towards substitution to the kinds of precautions
that "count" in litigation, rather than those that do not, regardless of
their relative efficacy. Indeed, in circumstances in which the defen-
dant and the plaintiff cannot observe each other, durable precautions
may be beneficial for defendants not only because they are visible to
tort litigation but because their alteration by plaintiffs is similarly visi-
ble. For a product manufacturer, evidence that a plaintiff disabled
35. Shavell's own brief discussions of this issue have been far less noticed than his distinction
between activity-level and care-level. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 181-82, 189 (2004) (discussing deterrence when care has several dimensions,
some of which are more difficult than others for courts to assess); Shavell, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, supra note 34, at 23 ("Any other variable omitted from the standard would also be
inappropriately chosen in many of the circumstances in which we said the same of the level of
activity.").
36. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions,
and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 293 (1988); Warren A. Seavey, Negli-
gence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17-26 (1927). Seavey cites a number of
cases that explicitly develop this point. See, e.g., Seavey, supra, at 25 n.20 (quoting Wood v.
Richmond & Danville R.R., 13 So. 552, 553 (Ala. 1892) (holding that "inattention, thoughtless-
ness, forgetfulness... constitute... contributory negligence per se"); Brett v. S. H. Frank & Co.,
94 P. 1051, 1052 (Cal. 1908) (rejecting plaintiff's suggestion that "inadvertence and forgetfulness
... [be] excused" given special circumstances)).
37. Grady, supra note 36.
38. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000); Frederick W. Cheney, The American Society of Anesthesiolo-
gists Closed Claims Project: What Have We Learned, How Has It Affected Practice, and How Will
It Affect Practice in the Future?, 91 ANESTHESIOLOGY 552 (1999).
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some safety device is more valuable than an unproveable accusation
of more generic contributory negligence. 39
As to both substitution of observable for nonobservable care, and
of durable for nondurable care, the substitution effect should not be
total, because even unobservable or uncredited care avoids accidents,
if not liability for those accidents that nonetheless occur. Nonetheless,
the effect is an important one to include in any analysis of damage
action deterrence, except in the rare areas of strict liability.40
It may be that damage action incentives are particularly likely to
apply differentially to alternate care choices when care crosses firm
boundaries, because those boundaries typically receive a good deal of
respect in litigation. Two final examples illustrate the issues. Some-
times entities are interested, perhaps because of vicarious liability or
indemnification obligations, in winning cases brought nominally
against their employees. For example, a hospital might have an inter-
est in cases brought against its residents (new doctors in training) who
are employees rather than contractors. Such a hospital will prefer the
kind of care that minimizes those residents' liability exposure-even if
that is not the kind of care that is most effective. Suppose hospital
investment in a computerized follow-up system reduces certain bad
outcomes but persuades malpractice juries to find for the defendant
resident doctors less often than less effective, but more doctor-focused
training. Hospitals under those circumstances will tend to prefer the
care that is most closely connected to the litigation defendants-the
doctors-even if that care is not as effective in life as it is in litigation.
We can expect to see the opposite effect in arenas in which firms are
not liable (vicariously or otherwise) for torts committed by their
agents. As Jennifer Arlen and W. Bentley MacLeod have elaborated
in a recent paper, this setup may discourage potential defendants from
exercising control over their contractors, even where such control
would be the best method of minimizing risk, because acts of control
might well persuade legal decisionmakers that liability should attach
to the firm and not just its contractor.41 This is yet another litigation-
39. See, e.g., Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div., 403 N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1980); Gerald A. Stein,
Comment, Product Design and Post-Manufacture Alteration: The Law of Subsequent Modifica-
tion in New York State, 13 PACE L. REV. 269 (1993). I thank Doug Kysar for suggesting this
point, which nicely expands my argument to cover defendants' anticipation of plaintiff-side
effects.
40. See Craswell, Deterrence and Damages, supra note 15, at 2217-19 (explaining that for pur-
poses of economic deterrence analysis, strict liability is even rarer than noneconomic doctrine
might find).
41. See Jennifer H. Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Beyond Master-Servant: A Critique of Vica-
rious Liability, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 240 (Stuart Madden ed., 2005).
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related substitution effect that renders consequentially different
choices that cost the same and engender similar amounts of risk.
Note that defendants' decisionmaking in each of the above exam-
ples is comparative rather than absolute. In other words, the issue for
a potential defendant is the probability of winning litigation given one
choice about type of care compared to the probability of winning liti-
gation given a different choice, not compared to some optimal
probability. Likewise, any obstacle to appropriate deterrence exists in
the comparison among choices-not in the absolute level of damages.
Acknowledgment of the comparative perspective tends to undermine
one common mode of analysis of deterrence, under which nonoptimal
litigation incentives are said to be over- or underdeterring. For exam-
ple, one could attach the label "overdeterrence" to the result in the
last example, about liability that discourages otherwise optimal firm
control over contractors; this would signal a diagnosis of the problem
as too much liability exposure for the firm. The evident solution
would then be to decrease that exposure. But once we notice that
firms think about damage action incentives by comparing their liabil-
ity exposure under each of the available caretaking choices, it be-
comes clear that any purported overdeterrence can equally and
accurately be labeled underdeterrence-in our example, too little lia-
bility for the firm's nonoptimal failure to exercise control over con-
tractors. This is a classic baseline problem.42 Unless one or the other
side of the status quo is privileged, whatever incentive problem exists
is properly considered neither overdeterrence nor underdeterrence,
but differential deterrence-solvable from either side of the balance
by adjusting the relationship between the two alternatives.
B. The Second Risk-Management Interest: Reducing Payout
Potential tort defendants are interested not only in entirely beating
cases that are brought against them, but in reducing how much they
must pay in either settled or litigated damages. Compared to the in-
terest in winning cases, it is harder to think of ways in which defend-
ants, ex ante, can structure the care they take or the harm they cause
in ways calculated to reduce payouts. But two substitution opportuni-
ties come to mind. First, because plaintiffs cannot get blood from a
stone, undercapitalization may appeal to potential defendants as a
42. Cf Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPO-
RARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (1996) (discussing the omnipresent baseline problems in consti-
tutional law).
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method to cap tort liability and other exposure. 43 Liability risk ac-
cordingly may induce potential defendants to structure their finances
in less than otherwise optimal ways; they may, for example, spin off a
new and undercapitalized corporate entity to conduct their risky busi-
ness, or contract with such an entity.44 This is neither a change in
amount or type of care, nor in type of harm-but it is a substitution of
one method of transacting business for another method with less
favorable damage action results. A caveat bears emphasis, however.
The pressure towards otherwise inefficient firm decisionmaking pro-
vided by the law's respect for corporate form may well be swamped by
potential defendants' belief that they are better off preventing acci-
dents (which requires control) and thereby avoiding even a small
chance of liability for those accidents.45 (Similarly, the substitution
effect of observable for unobservable care might be swamped if the
unobservable care produced better accident-avoidance, and therefore
fewer claims.)
Another example is perhaps not entirely plausible, but instructive
nonetheless. Observers have occasionally observed that, "under the
common law ... it was financially less burdensome to tortfeasors to
kill than merely to maim their victims." '46 The idea is that because of
the sharp damages limits incorporated into the law of wrongful death
actions,47 defendants' interest in reducing payout may, perversely, en-
courage them to kill their victims rather than injure them.48 It is per-
fectly plausible that wrongful death damage limits underdeter
43. See Richard R.W. Brooks, Liability and Organizational Choice, 45 J.L. & ECON. 91 (2002);
see also sources cited id. at 92 n.3.
44. If the out-of-house contractor were not undercapitalized, it would face the same liability
exposure as the first firm and would presumably demand adequate compensation for that expo-
sure. Of course, this is merely an example of the kind of "make or buy" decisions that are
crucial to firm boundaries. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA, N.S.
386 (1937), reprinted in R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33 (1988). The
contracting, undercapitalized entities may themselves face nonoptimal incentives for care-see
Lewis A. Komhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal
Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1345 (1982); S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986); Alan 0. Sykes, Note, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious
Liability Under the Law of Agency, 91 YALE L.J. 168 (1981)-but that is not the point here.
45. See Brooks, supra note 43.
46. Mosier v. Carney, 138 N.W.2d 343, 353 (Mich. 1965).
47. For a list of the wrongful death statutes of all fifty states, see Andrew J. McClurg, Dead
Sorrow: A Story About Loss and a New Theory of Wrongful Death Damages, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1,
25-26 nn.129-31 (2005). The statutes allow only limited liability; at common law, the rule was
against any liability at all. Id. at 18-20; see also Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death,
17 STAN. L. REV. 1043 (1965).
48. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 187 (1987); Andrew Jay McClurg, It's a Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic Dam-
ages in Wrongful Death Cases, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57 (1990).
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accidents in general. But to the extent anyone really takes seriously
the argument about defendants preferring to kill than merely to maim,
that argument seems overblown for three reasons. First, intentional
killing is obviously deterred by far more stringent sanctions than those
provided by damage actions-criminal law being the most obvious ex-
ample. Second, the kinds of conditions that cause accidental deaths
rather than accidental injuries probably also cause more, not fewer,
injuries. Finally, deaths create large opportunities for associated dam-
ages not covered by the wrongful death limits. 49 Yet notwithstanding
how implausible it is that wrongful death damages caps cause poten-
tial defendants to prefer to kill rather than to injure, I present the
argument to demonstrate that the search for substitution effects needs
to look not just for features of doctrine or litigation practice that po-
tentially encourage the substitution of one type of care for another,
but also for features that encourage the substitution of one type of
harm for another. I pursue this point in the next section.
C. The Third Risk-Management Interest: Avoiding Litigation
Because litigation is costly both in terms of outlay and other exter-
nal effects such as reputational damage, potential damage-action de-
fendants even have an interest in avoiding litigation they can handily
win. One good way to avoid litigation is to avoid causing harm.
Sometimes, as already stated, potential defendants can avoid imposing
injury by exercising augmented care. Moreover, the interest in win-
ning litigation is obviously tied to the interest in avoiding litigation
altogether; the more likely a case is to lead to a defense verdict, if it
reaches trial, the less likely a plaintiffs' lawyer will agree to take it on
contingency. Perhaps this is what is behind the finding of a recent
study that obstetricians in one medical center who followed current
standard clinical practice-later crystallized into an explicit "clinical
pathway" document-were nearly six times less likely to be made a
defendant to a malpractice claim, compared to a control group of doc-
tors with a similarly high rate of caesarean section and assorted
complications.50
49. See David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 256 (1989); Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Mal-
practice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 432-35 (2005).
50. See Scott B. Ransom, David M. Studdert, Mitchell P. Dombrowski, Michelle M. Mello &
Troyen A. Brennan, Reduced Medicolegal Risk by Compliance With Obstetric Clinical Pathways:
A Case-Control Study, 101 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 751 (2003); see also Hyams et al., Two
Way Street, supra note 30; Hyams et al., Early Retrospective, supra note 30.
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But as I argued above with respect to defendants' interests in win-
ning cases and minimizing damages, other strategies may prove effec-
tive for litigation avoidance as well. Instead of augmenting care and
thereby avoiding harm, for example, potential defendants have reason
instead to hide the harm they cause, or to shift to a type of harm
whose victims cannot transform themselves into plaintiffs. 51 In some
circumstances, this set of incentives can simply induce secrecy, either
as to the source of potentially compensable harm or as to its existence
at all. 52 For example, some observers believe that fear of malpractice
litigation renders doctors more reluctant to tell patients that the harm
they are experiencing was preventable. 53 Such suppression of infor-
mation-production for fear of resulting litigation 54 has no necessary
deterrent impact; there are not necessarily more accidents because
those that occur are kept secret (although secrecy will tend to lead to
underclaiming, which may undermine deterrent incentives, depending
on the expected damages of taking less or otherwise cheaper care).
But if the information that would otherwise have been generated
would somehow have been used by a potential defendant organization
to reduce harm, its underproduction can be problematic. In a recent
paper, Omri Ben-Shahar made this point with respect to product
safety research. 55 Ben-Shahar argued that new information about
safety problems (and the resulting action, for example a product re-
call) can provoke a deluge of new suits by plaintiffs who learn that
their injury might be compensable, and therefore vastly increased lia-
bility for the producer. The result, he suggested, is so much liability
that it discourages socially useful product research. Jennifer Arlen has
51. Cf William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transfor-
mation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 631 (1981).
52. See, e.g., Arun S. Malik, Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement, 21 RAND J.
ECON. 341 (1990).
53. A recent article cites sources that make this accusation, while refuting its accuracy. Hy-
man & Silver, supra note 29, at 909-14, 923-28. And even if liability encourages information
suppression, the strategy may well backfire. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organi-
zations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 1447 (2000) (sug-
gesting that plaintiffs bring medical malpractice lawsuits in part in order to get an explanation of
what went wrong). Jennifer Arlen has explored a similar phenomenon in which corporate enti-
ties avoid monitoring their agents, for fear of uncovering corporate liability-inducing miscon-
duct. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994).
54. On the topic of tort law's incentivization of ex ante evidence manipulation, see Jason S.
Johnston, Bayesian Fact-Finding and Efficiency: Toward an Economic Theory of Liability Under
Uncertainty, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 137, 157 & n.32 (1987).
55. Omri Ben-Shahar, How Liability Distorts Incentives of Manufacturers to Recall Products,
(Social Science Research Network, Working Paper No. 655804, 2005), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=655804.
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made a similar point in a parallel, corporate criminal context,56 and it
is a recurrent claim of those who oppose the current medical malprac-
tice liability system.5 7
Other times, the interest in avoiding litigation can push potential
defendants not just to conceal harm and its tortious origins from vic-
tims, but to prefer those types of harm that are more easily concealed.
Some harms, that is, are less easily demonstrable than others, and
where a potential defendant can substitute less demonstrable for more
demonstrable harm, damage action incentives may induce that substi-
tution, in whole or in part. One prominent example is the docu-
mented tendency of employers to discriminate against job applicants
whose treatment, if they are hired, is regulated under the civil rights
laws. 58 Because failure-to-hire violations are extremely difficult for
the affected applicants to detect or prove, and are therefore not often
the subject of lawsuits, 59 it turns out that in order to avoid the poten-
tial of a fair employment action by a person of color or a person with a
disability, many employers violate the fair employment laws in hiring.
Finally, the possibility of future damage actions can cause regulated
parties to substitute away from cognizable harm towards harm that,
even if demonstrable, is not legally cognizable. That is, just as poten-
tial defendants will tend to substitute care for which they receive
credit for care that is unrecognized by the tort system, they will tend
to substitute harm that is unrecognized for harm cognizable in tort.
56. See Arlen, supra note 53.
57. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 38, at 109-31. For example, "[Tihe promi-
nence of litigation can be a substantial deterrent to the development and maintenance of the
reporting systems discussed in this report." Id. at 110.
58. See e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 513, 519 (1987) (explaining that the prospect of civil rights litigation makes African Ameri-
can employees more costly to hire); Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q.Word as Red Herring:
Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1489
(1996) ("[Flar from producing hiring quotas that induce employers to discriminate in favor of
minorities, disparate impact liability may actually induce hiring discrimination against minorities
(and other protected groups)."); Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REv.
223 (2000) (analyzing the economic impact of targeted antidiscrimination and accommodation
rules governing hiring and work terms); Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, Sorting, Quotas, and the
Civil Rights Act of 1991: Who Hires When It's Hard to Fire?, 45 J.L. & ECON. 41, 41 (2002)
(finding empirical support for Title VII's hypothesized "sorting effect, which causes firms that
are more susceptible to discrimination litigation to substitute away from protected workers").
59. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimi-
nation Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015-21, 1023-32 (1991) (documenting shift in antidis-
crimination enforcement actions away from failure-to-hire cases toward discriminatory firing
cases). To be clear, I am not suggesting that the net effect of fair employment laws is negative,
but merely that there are some negative effects along with some positive ones. How they sum is
a difficult question well beyond the scope of this essay. For analysis of the question, see Samuel
R. Bagenstos, Has the Americans with Disabilities Act Reduced Employment for People with
Disabilities?, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 527 (2004).
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Again the medical system provides an example. Doctors must deal
with the risk of malpractice liability by choosing among a combination
of responses. They can do just what they would have done in the ab-
sence of liability threat; they can change the care they provide in some
way; they can buy malpractice insurance; and they can turn away high-
risk patients. Because the quality of care is regulated by tort but the
acceptance or rejection of patients is not,60 the last choice amounts to
the substitution of an unregulated activity for a regulated one. We
should expect to see such substitutions as a result of anticipated dam-
age actions. Again, my point is not that this substitution is necessarily
problematic. Whether doctors' turning patients away harms social
welfare requires much more analysis. Perhaps not; high risk patients
may be best seen by others who can develop increased expertise in
their care, and therefore fear malpractice liability less. But maybe
there is indeed a problem; maybe the patients cannot find alternative
treatment.61 In either event, the substitution effect exists.
In the arena of constitutional torts, commentators and policymakers
have analyzed the damage action incentives pushing defendants to
substitute noncognizable harm for cognizable harm; both scholars and
courts have speculated that fear of liability will "chill" vigorous action
by public officials. 62 The pioneering investigations of this topic pre-
mised their concern about a constitutional tort chilling effect on the
nonregulation, or at least the relative nonregulation, of governmental
inaction. 63 To reorient this "chilling effect" argument towards the
analysis I am using here, the concern is that because harm caused by
60. Note that in some limited circumstances, a medical professional's rejection of patients is,
in fact, regulated. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7)(F), 12182(a),
12182(b)(3) (2000) (banning discrimination, including by doctors, against people with disabilities
unless, inter alia, treatment poses a "direct threat to the health or safety of others"); Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000); Abbott v. Bragdon, 163
F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that HIV-infected patient did not pose a sufficient "direct
threat" to treating dentist to justify his refusal to treat her); see also Tiana Mayere Lee, An
EMTALA Primer: The Impact of Changes in the Emergency Medicine Landscape on EMTALA
Compliance and Enforcement, 13 ANNALs HEALTH L. 145 (2004).
61. See PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 85 (1991).
62. The classic scholarly presentations of this argument are by Peter Schuck and Jerry
Mashaw. Schuck, for example, wrote in depth in 1983 of "society's interest in encouraging offi-
cials to act promptly, decisively, and without excessive self-regard or calculation" in order "to
accomplish the public's business in socially efficient, cost-minimizing ways." PETER H. SCHUCK,
SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 21 (1983). He described how
damage actions might threaten these interests and labeled the threat "overdeterrence." Id. See
also Jerry L. Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officers: Property Rights and Official Ac-
countability, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 8, 26-29 (1978).
63. See SCHUCK, supra note 62, at 64-65; Mashaw, supra note 62, at 26-29.
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inaction is often noncognizable in constitutional tort suits,64 but harm
caused by action is cognizable, potential constitutional tort defendants
will substitute unregulated inaction for regulated action. This prob-
lem has been considered one of overdeterrence 6 5-too much liability,
which produces not, in this instance, too little care, but too little activ-
ity. But, again, it is equally plausible to see the problem inhering in
the constitutional doctrine that bars official liability for inaction and
the poor incentive that creates to oversupply inaction. That is, the
'comparative nature of the problem means it would be just as accurate
to label it underdeterrence as overdeterrence (and, as in the contrac-
tor control example above, more accurate than either to label it differ-
ential deterrence). After all, the solution could be more rather than
less regulation; if inaction were regulated, its substitution for action
would be far less attractive.
IV. CONCLUSION: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This essay has examined ways in which the expected value of dam-
ages varies not only with the frequency and amount of harm inflicted
but also with the type of care and harm. I have suggested that poten-
tial defendants contemplating their liability exposure under substan-
tive law, as it is inflected by procedural practice and rules,66 are
encouraged to substitute cognizable and demonstrable care for less
cognizable and demonstrable care, and to substitute noncognizable
and nondemonstrable types of harm for more cognizable and demon-
strable harm. Sometimes the results are favorable for social welfare;
other times not.
What then is the appropriate policy response to the insight I have
described? A multiplier solution is certainly theoretically possible,
and could put every decision about care or harm on the same metric
with the same baseline. But it is difficult enough to contemplate, as
Polinsky and Shavell did, multipliers that counteract the simpler phe-
64. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989) (refusing to
hold county agency liable under the Due Process Clause for failure to intervene to save an
abused child from his abuser).
65. See SCHUCK, supra note 62.
66. Lawyers, repeat litigants, and policymakers understand that these work in concert to es-
tablish the range of expected outcomes in damage actions; that is why "tort reform" statutes so
often effect procedural rather than substantive changes. Yet scholarship about deterrence has
stinted the ways in which the litigation process affects expected litigants' incentives for compli-
ance with legal norms. As Lewis Kornhauser has summarized the economic literature on adjudi-
cation, "Economic analyses of substantive legal rules generally suppress the adjudication of
factual and legal disputes that a legal rule might engender." Lewis A. Kornhauser, Judicial Or-
ganization and Administration, in V ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS
OF CRIME AND LITIGATION 27, 27 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
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nomenon of underclaiming, particularly because it seems that many
participants in experimental jury simulations are reluctant to award
punitive damages that correspond with the identity principle's re-
quirements.67 And a multiplier solution seems even less attractive
once it includes, as Craswell has pointed out that it must, the result
that damage awards vary inversely with the egregiousness of a defen-
dant's conduct, because less egregious violations of a legal norm are
more likely to go unsanctioned. 68 Moreover, the legal doctrines and
factors that produce the substitution opportunities with which I have,
been concerned are not so easily set aside. To line up every care and
harm choice in terms of its harm-avoidance yield requires eliminating
(or counteracting), for example, the rules that official inaction is not
tortious, that firm boundaries are to be respected in litigation, and so
on.
6 9
It seems to me that targeted interventions that take the varied sub-
stitution opportunities into account would be far more fruitful than
interventions that pay no such attention. The general theory of the
second best weighs heavily in favor of piecemeal rather than whole-
sale policy change. 70 This essay's examples similarly counsel in favor
of modesty in ambitions for deterrent optimality. It is hard enough to
use ex ante anticipation of damages to get close to a chosen policy
outcome, much less to do any fine regulatory calibration. Moreover,
because the substitution opportunities vary greatly depending on the
legal and factual context, interventions should nearly always be piece-
meal ones-they might well go astray if they are not. For example,
consider the problem of the so-called "chilling effect" in the arena of
constitutional torts. Recall that this problem occurs because officials
face liability when they act but do not face liability when they fail to
act. 71 The Supreme Court's response has been the transubstantive
doctrine of qualified immunity, which exempts from suit individual of-
ficials whose conduct, though unlawful, was not objectively unreason-
able. 72 This is, indeed, an intervention designed to solve a substitution
67. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want
Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (2000).
68. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
69. For example, Omri Ben-Shahar's paper about the distortion of product recall decisions
caused by the jump in claiming that occurs after a manufacturer does a recall suggests as a
solution a damage rule that "reduce[s] the manufacturer's liability when he does recall the prod-
uct, to offset the 'floodgates' effect and thus eliminate the advantage for the manufacturer of
leaving the product on the market too long." Ben-Shahar, supra note 55, at 24.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 2-6.
71. See supra text accompanying note 63.
72. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982); see also Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 408 (1997) (rejecting qualified immunity
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effect. But it goes too far. The policy payoff of the comparative anal-
ysis suggested here is that although it is reasonable to be concerned
about a harm substitution-a chilling effect-where there are availa-
ble to defendants categories of harm beyond the reach of damages
liability, in contexts where regulation via damage action is more uni-
form, this substitution problem fades. In prisons and jails, unlike in
the social state at large, governmental actors do have enforceable af-
firmative obligations, and inaction can be extremely costly. Failing to
protect inmates from assault or rape by other inmates, failing to pro-
vide medical care, failing to prevent a predictable suicide-these are
often the fact patterns in the small sliver of successful inmate law-
suits. 73 So in correctional settings, substituting inaction for action is
actually likely to be a very ineffective method of avoiding liability risk,
and one that does not tempt officials. Correspondingly, there is un-
likely to be a "chilling effect" problem in need of the qualified immu-
nity solution. 74 The point is that transubstantive deterrence fixes are
likely to create their own difficulties, as they attempt to solve
problems that are in fact fairly narrow.
One final policy point will suffice. This essay's airing of substitution
effects evidences the many levers available to policymakers interested
in fine-tuning damage action deterrence. There are a huge variety of
rules-about damages, or proof, or any other of the parameters that
factor into the generation of ex ante damages expectations-that are
available as targets for reform-minded tinkering. This ought to render
us particularly skeptical of policy proposals that too readily sacrifice
compensatory goals on the altar of optimal deterrence.
for private prison staff, but describing caselaw relating to Court's desire to avoid "unwarranted
timidity" by government officials).
73. See Schlanger, supra note 27, at 1674-75; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994) (holding that the failure to protect inmate plaintiff from foreseen harm by other inmates
may constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976)
(same, for failure to provide medical care); Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d 413, 417 (8th Cir. 2000)
(same, for failure to respond to known risk of suicide).
74. John Jeffries has made a similar plea against transubstantive application of overdeterrence
fears, advocating that courts "abandon the 'one-size-fits-all' approach and adapt remedies to
specific rights." See John C. Jeffries, Jr, Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259,
259 (2000). Jeffries argues, "[T]he conditions that make overdeterrence a realistic fear in the
realm of search and seizure do not necessarily obtain elsewhere." Id. at 270.
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